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Authorized Investigation: A Temperate Alternative to 
Cyber Insecurity 
Casey M. Bruner* 
“Wage war honorably. 
You may be obliged to wage war but not to use poison arrows.”1 
-Baltasar Gracián 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, “Operation Shady RAT” became universally known as one 
of the most widespread and pervasive cyber espionage campaigns ever 
discovered.2 The security breach, which persisted over a five-year period, 
infected more than seventy organizations worldwide including: federal 
and state government entities, high-tech and communications businesses, 
thirteen different national defense contractors, and the International 
Olympic Committee, among others.3 The Operation Shady RAT vulner-
ability promulgated the way most computer viruses do: through an email 
and an attachment.4 An employee of one of the infected defense contrac-
tors received an email with an Excel file attached.5 The file contained a 
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 1. BALTASAR GRACIÁN, THE ART OF WORLDLY WISDOM 67 (Joseph Jacobs trans., Dover 
Publications 2005) (1653). 
 2. See DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, MCAFEE, REVEALED: OPERATIONS SHADY RAT (2011), 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf; see also WILLIAM C. 
HANNAS ET AL., CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE: TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION AND MILITARY 
MODERNIZATION 220 (2013) (stating that some experts believe that the “Shady RAT” vulnerability 
originated in China). 
 3. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 2, at 2. 
 4. Hon Lau, The Truth Behind the Shady RAT, SYMANTEC SECURITY RESPONSE BLOG (Aug. 4, 
2011), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/truth-behind-shady-rat. 
 5. Kelly Jackson Higgins, ‘Operation Shady RAT’ Attackers Employed Steganography, DARK 
READING (Aug. 11, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/operation-shady-
rat-attackers-employed-s/231400084. 
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list of high-level executives that recently attended a popular industry 
event—useful information the employee was likely to open.6 When 
opened, the file initiated backdoor communications with the hackers’ 
server allowing the hackers to access the contractor’s system and estab-
lish more footholds, ensuring long-term network access.7 With this ac-
cess, hackers were able to steal trade secrets, specifications and designs 
for classified defense technology, and anything else they were able to 
find on the compromised organizations’ servers.8 While the pervasive-
ness of Operation Shady RAT may be shocking for some, experts insist 
that this was merely one operation and that cyber espionage is a threat 
that affects nearly every industry and every country—the only ones im-
mune to attack are those without anything valuable to steal.9 
In another striking example, the McAfee security company discov-
ered an extensive cyber espionage campaign, dubbed “Night Dragon,” 
which targeted global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies.10 Night 
Dragon was more narrowly focused than Operation Shady RAT, in that it 
specifically targeted “sensitive competitive proprietary operations and 
project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field bids . . . .”11 
The perpetrators of the Night Dragon operation were seeking information 
on the amount of money major oil and energy companies would be bid-
ding on various projects around the world. Armed with this information, 
a country’s state-owned enterprises could theoretically underbid their 
competitors by one dollar on each contract, effectively pushing the com-
petition out of the market and taking all of the work.12 
The vulnerability of our networks and computers, as evidenced by 
these and other attacks, is resulting in the loss of petabytes13 of valuable 
information, costing the U.S. economy billions of dollars, weakening its 
ability to defend its own people, and compromising the integrity and reli-
ability of its critical infrastructure.14 Why is this such a pervasive and 
seemingly unfixable problem? What should be done about it? In response 
                                                            
 6. Id. 
 7. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 2, at 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See McAfee Foundstone Professional Services & McAfee Labs, Global Energy 
Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”, MCAFEE (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. The Night Dragon attacks are believed by many security experts to have originated in Chi-
na and could have been perpetrated on behalf of Chinese state-owned energy companies. See 
HANNAS ET AL., supra note 2, at 220. 
 13. A petabyte is 1,000,000 gigabytes. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
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to these questions, many security experts have concluded that the purely 
defensive network protection measures of the past are insufficient and 
are now urging private industries and governments to supplement their 
security protocols with “active defense” or “hack-back” cyber defense 
tools.15 Hack-back is a method of cybersecurity that involves some level 
of retaliation, or “counterstrike,” against the hacker.16 While the desire 
for hack-back measures is understandable given the magnitude of the 
problem, the practice is fraught with potential collateral damage and pri-
vacy concerns.17 Nonetheless, some individuals and organizations have 
already begun to implement this legally questionable practice.18 
This Note aims to show that legal structures created to protect the 
Internet in its original form are completely insufficient to protect what 
the Internet has become. This antiquated legal framework is exacerbating 
the problem. The breadth of activity that the current law restricts severely 
limits the remedies that cyberattack victims can pursue, and it must be 
updated.19 While full hack-back may prove necessary in the long run, I 
argue for a more temperate initial response to the problem—I call this 
response “authorized investigation.” Specifically, the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act should be amended to allow victims access to their at-
tackers’ computers for purposes of investigation without incurring crimi-
nal and civil liability. 
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the foundations, 
original purposes, and philosophies that surrounded the inception of the 
Internet and the legal framework that developed as a result. Part III dis-
cusses current cyberthreats, and the damage these threats can do to our 
economic and national security infrastructures. Part IV discusses pro-
posed methods of stopping and deterring cyberattacks, ranging from 
purely defensive measures to full-blown hack-back. Finally, Part V pro-
poses a model of “authorized investigation,” which would grant victims 
                                                            
 15. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense 
and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 415 (2012); Shane McGee et al., Adequate 
Attribution: A Framework for Developing a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active De-
fense, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2013); Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory 
Hacking by Non-State Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2013). 
 16. See infra Part IV.B. 
 17. See McGee et al., supra note 15, at 43. 
 18. Stewart Baker, RATs and Poison: Can Cyberespionage Victims Counterhack?, SKATING 
ON STILTS (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-stilts/2012/10/us-law-keeps-
victims-from-counterhacking-intruders.html. See also Jeremy Wagstaff, More Companies Hacking 
Back at Cyber Attackers, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 9, 2015, 1:36 PM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/more-companies-hacking-back-cyber-attackers. 
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
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of cyberattacks limited authorization to access and investigate computers 
used in the attack. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1972, at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Washington, D.C., a 
group of scientists, engineers, and researchers came together for the first 
ever International Computer Communications Conference. Also in at-
tendance was a government engineer, Robert Kahn, who worked for the 
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA)—a small unit established 
by President Eisenhower to pursue scientific advancement beyond 
short-term military need.20 More simply, ARPA was created to ensure 
that the U.S. military possessed the world’s most advanced technology.21 
Kahn was there to demonstrate ARPA’s newest achievement: a group of 
twenty computers, all networked together and able to communicate with 
each other through a revolutionary “packet switching” technology—
ARPANET, the first computer network, was born.22 
ARPANET, which would eventually develop into the Internet as we 
know it today, was the brainchild of a small network consisting of the 
federal government, universities, and research centers.23 Its initial func-
tions were exclusively to facilitate collaborative research and scientific 
advancement and to help facilitate long-range governmental and military 
communications, particularly in times of national security crises.24 In 
fact, commercial Internet use was banned until 1992.25 In the 
mid-1990s—after the commercial Internet ban was lifted—computers 
and Internet use and access was only practically accessible to a few.26 
The limitations on the type and quantity of Internet users—as well as the 
                                                            
 20. See Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Number 5105.15 (Dep’t 
of Defense Feb. 7, 1958) (“In accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 
1947, . . . there is established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Department of Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. . . . The Agency shall be responsible for the direction or per-
formance of such advanced projects in the field of research and development as the Secretary of 
Defense shall [designate] . . . .”). 
 21. ARPA is still in existence but is now known as DARPA. See ARPA-DARPA: The Name 
Chronicles, DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/ARPA-DARPA__The_Name_ 
Chronicles.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). 
 22. See Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
 23. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 82 (2011). 
 24. Id.; see also JOEL BRENNER, GLASS HOUSES: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND CYBER INSECURITY 
IN A TRANSPARENT WORLD 15 (2013). 
 25. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 23, at 82. 
 26. Id. 
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assumption that the Internet would be used only for morally upright pur-
poses—led to an intentionally “lawless” and “government-free” Inter-
net.27 
As the Internet grew in breadth and accessibility, early attempts at 
government regulation were treated with great hostility. One of the early, 
significant attempts to regulate the Internet and its content was the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).28 The CDA was intended 
to protect children from obscene, indecent, and pornographic material on 
the Internet.29 Advocates for “open-Internet” argued that the CDA’s 
criminal provisions were overly broad and violated the First Amendment 
to the Constitution.30 After the President signed the legislation, John Per-
ry Barlow, an early open-Internet advocate, responded in his now famous 
speech called the “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” by 
proudly and defiantly declaring to governments around the world, “Your 
legal concepts . . . do not apply to us.”31 The only governance necessary 
to rule the Internet, according to Barlow, would come “from ethics, en-
lightened self-interest, and the commonweal . . . .”32 
This idea—that a system this complex could intentionally exclude 
governance and operate on the naïve belief that its users would act ethi-
cally absent the rule of law—is one that has restricted the government 
from maintaining any real order online and has removed all traces of the 
centuries old common law defense-of-self and defense-of-property con-
cepts, both of which are well-established in both criminal33 and civil 
law.34 As a result, the legal framework that exists, built on a handful of 
                                                            
 27. One of the four principles set out by Robert Kahn for how information transition would 
take place over the networks was “[t]here should be no global control at the operations level.” Id. 
Additionally, Larry Roberts, who wrote the code for an early version of the transmission protocol, 
knew the code was insecure. Id. at 83. However, at the time, the network was so small that it was not 
a concern. Id. 
 28. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. 5, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 
(1996). 
 29. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (“[The law] prohibits the knowing transmission 
of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.”). 
 30. The law was, in fact, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See id. 
 31. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 425 (2d ed. 2004) (“In general, one who is 
free from fault may use force to defend his or her person or property against harm threatened by the 
unlawful act of another if: (i) the person cannot avoid the threatened harm without using defense 
force or giving up some right or privilege; and (ii) the force used for this purpose is not excessive in 
view of the harm which it is intended to prevent.”). 
 34. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 112 (12th ed. 2010) (“As in the case of self-defense, the privilege to defend property is 
limited to the use of force reasonably necessary to the situation as it appears to the defendant.”). 
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broad, ambiguous statutes and little case law, tips the balance of power 
unquestionably in favor of those who intend to use the Internet for harm. 
Additionally, there is little remedial action available to responsible users 
who are wronged. Criminal statutes do little to deter cybercriminals, 
while law-abiding citizens are unable to legally defend themselves. Had 
stronger governance of the Internet been allowed early on, perhaps there 
would be more effective policing of cybercrime today. Alternatively, had 
the Internet been left without “legal concepts,” in a Hobbesian state, pri-
vate individuals would have the ability to defend themselves without fear 
of criminal prosecution or civil suit. Ironically, by aiming for the middle 
ground, and trusting that only “good” people would use the Internet, the 
current system appears to be a combination of the worst of both worlds. 
A handful of statutes now govern the way users, good or bad, may 
act in the cyberspace realm; two of these statutes are the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (CFAA)35 and the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA).36 Also relevant are the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
(EEA)37 and section 1637 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 
2015.38 Each of these statutes, in its own way, tips the scale of network 
defense in favor of cybercriminals and cyberspies and against those try-
ing to protect their own networks. 
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The CFAA criminalizes a wide variety of actions related to the un-
authorized access or misuse of computers.39 In its broadest provision, the 
CFAA provides: “Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer with-
out authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby ob-
tains . . . information from any protected computer . . . shall be pun-
ished . . . .”40 The statute defines “protected computer” as “a comput-
er . . . which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication, including a computer located outside the United 
States . . . .”41 Experts have aptly noted that the statute covers nearly any 
computer connected to the Internet from any location.42 Because any un-
authorized access, or any activity that exceeds authorization, is a viola-
                                                            
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2001). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013). 
 38. National Defense Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1637, 128 Stat. 3292 
(2014). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
 40. Id. § 1030(a) (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
 42. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 492. 
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tion of the statute, it appears interaction with any computer without au-
thorization is a violation of the CFAA.43 In a striking example of the 
CFAA’s immense breadth, federal prosecutors, attempting to find novel 
avenues to combat the growing and serious epidemic of cyberbullying, 
argued that Lori Drew violated the CFAA when she created a MySpace 
account under the name and profile picture of a fictitious person44—a 
violation of MySpace’s Terms of Service (ToS).45 However, after the 
jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial judge overturned the conviction 
and declared the interpretation of the law invalid under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.46 
In addition to the CFAA’s overly broad criminal provisions, the Act 
also provides for a civil cause of action, allowing the victim to sue the 
hacker for any violation of the CFAA’s felony provisions for compensa-
tory damages or equitable relief.47 However, these claims can only be 
brought against a known violator.48 Given the current state of traceback 
technology,49 and the stringent service of process requirements for inter-
national actors, the CFAA is unlikely to have any significant deterrent 
effect or provide any substantial relief to victims of cyberattacks. The 
CFAA does, however, dissuade legitimate actors from acting in 
self-defense because they fear potential criminal prosecution for nearly 
any retaliatory measures taken. 
Finally, in a brief nod to cyber defense, the CFAA grants a very 
limited exemption to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of crimi-
nal investigation, yet it provides no investigative authority to the actual 
victims of cyberattacks.50 Therefore, a company that was attacked, and 
                                                            
 43. Stewart Baker, RATs and Poison II—The Legal Case for Counterhacking, SKATING ON 
STILTS (Oct. 13, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://www.skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-stilts/2012/10/rat-
poison-the-legal-case-for-counterhacking.html. 
 44. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Drew allegedly, with others, 
created a profile of “Josh Evans,” who began an online relationship with Megan Meier. Id. Later, 
“Josh” began bullying Megan. Id. Megan later committed suicide. Id. 
 45. Id. at 454. MySpace’s terms of service require that “all registration information you submit 
is truthful and accurate . . . .” Id. Therefore, according to the prosecutors, submitting any false regis-
tration information to MySpace was a criminal act under the CFAA. Id. 
 46. Id. at 467 (“In sum, if any conscious breach of a website’s terms of service is held to be 
sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or in excess 
of authorization, the result will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law ‘that affords too much 
discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].’”) (quoting 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999)). 
 47. Kesan & Hayes, supra note 15, at 491. 
 48. See id. at 494. 
 49. Current traceback technology currently boasts, at best, 87% accuracy. However, tracing an 
attacker is often made more difficult, and more inaccurate, by anti-tracing measures such as 
IP-spoofing. Id. at 481–82. 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2008). 
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potentially had valuable trade secrets or sensitive customer information 
stolen, may not interact with the hacker’s computer in an “unauthorized” 
manner without facing criminal liability. Clearly, the CFAA provides 
little disincentive to criminal actors, but severely limits the defensive 
remedies available to those who wish to operate within the law. 
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
The ECPA prohibits: 
(1) the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications 
(wiretapping); (2) access to the content of stored electronic commu-
nications and to communications transaction records; and (3) the 
use of trap and trace devices and pen registers.51 
Generally, the ECPA prohibits the interception or monitoring of phone 
and Internet communication.52 However, the ECPA does provide some 
exemptions, including a general exemption for phone and Internet ser-
vice providers who intercept, disclose, or use information while engaged 
in any activity that is “a necessary incident to the rendition of his ser-
vice[,]” such as “mechanical or service quality control checks.”53 Thus, 
while an Internet service provider can monitor traffic over its network to 
ensure that its services are working correctly, an Internet service provider 
may not, absent a court order, share this information with law enforce-
ment.54 As a result, service providers can sometimes see—in real time—
cyberattacks happening over their networks, but cannot do anything 
about it; additionally, the U.S. intelligence community, which has pro-
prietary intelligence on current cyberthreats, cannot share this infor-
mation with industry actors.55 The result is a worldwide network where 
cybercriminals can move about and conduct their activities, while neither 
private service providers nor intelligence communities may inform the 
other about what is happening. 
The proposed Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(CISPA) intends to eliminate this legal barrier to communication be-
                                                            
 51. See EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42409, CYBERSECURITY: SELECTED 
LEGAL ISSUES 20 (2013) (footnotes omitted), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R42409.pdf. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2008). 
 54. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii). 
 55. U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE 
ROGERS-RUPPERSBERGER CYBERSECURITY BILL (H.R. 624) 1 (2013), available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/images/BackgrounderApril172013.pdf
. 
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tween industry and government.56 CISPA would grant Internet service 
providers and government agencies limited authority to share anonymous 
cyberthreat information with each other to better protect their networks.57 
Congressional consideration of CISPA, like other Internet-related laws, 
has been met with great hostility from many privacy advocates, despite 
the bill’s extensive civil protection and privacy measures.58 Because 
CISPA passage and implementation would only allow for better coordi-
nation against cyberthreats—without increasing the tools for defense 
against those threats—it will only marginally help secure cyberspace.59 
While better information sharing is necessary, it is only part of the solu-
tion. 
C. The Economic Espionage Act 
Congress responded to the rise in international intellectual property 
theft by passing the EEA of 1996.60 When President Clinton signed the 
legislation, he stated that the new law “will help us crack down on acts 
like software piracy and copyright infringement that cost American busi-
nesses billions of dollars in lost revenues. And it will advance our na-
tional security.”61 
In actuality, the law has little to do with piracy, copyright infringe-
ment, or national security. The EEA criminalized two distinct actions: (1) 
economic espionage, and (2) the theft of trade secrets.62 Economic espio-
nage is defined as stealing, misappropriating, or receiving trade secrets 
while “intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign 
government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent . . . .”63 Trade se-
cret theft, on the other hand, is defined as stealing, misappropriating, or 
                                                            
 56. U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, MYTH V. 
FACT: H.R. 624, THE CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT (CISPA) (2013),  
available at 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/cispamythvfact04172013.p
df. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See The NSA’s Favorite Anti-Privacy Law, CISPA, Is Back, FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE, 
http://www.cispaisback.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 59. As of this writing, CISPA failed to pass the 113th Congress. With the retirement of Repre-
sentative Mike Rogers, the bill’s primary advocate, it seems unlikely to pass in the next Congress. 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013). 
 61. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (Oct. 11, 
1996), available at  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52087. 
 62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013); 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2013). 
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receiving trade secrets “with intent to convert [the] trade secret . . . to the 
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof . . . .”64 
Although the EEA could be used to bring criminal charges against 
hackers, doing so is problematic for a number of reasons. The first prob-
lem is attribution. Like many civil actions proposed as cybertheft deter-
rents, it is extremely difficult to identify the perpetrator of a cyberattack; 
it is difficult to sue someone who you cannot identify. Without additional 
investigative tools, identifying the hacker is unlikely to happen with the 
level of certainty required to bring criminal charges under the EEA. 
Even if the hacker could reasonably be identified, adequate service 
of process is problematic. This has been problematic for prosecutors un-
der the EEA even when the alleged espionage was committed in the 
physical world.65 Most cases classified as cyber espionage originate 
overseas, with a disproportionate amount coming from China and Rus-
sia.66 In one case of Chinese industrial espionage, federal prosecutors 
attempted to serve a Chinese company for trade secret theft by serving 
the company’s U.S. subsidiary.67 The trial court judge found that service 
was improper and quashed the indictment.68 
More recently, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five Chinese 
hackers for their cyberspying.69 It is widely assumed that no prosecutions 
will take place because of similar jurisdictional issues.70 With most of the 
defendants outside of the United States, the EEA is unlikely to result in 
significant prosecutions and will therefore provide little deterrent effect 
to cyberspies. As a whole, the EEA has been largely ineffective and has 
not resulted in any significant international or economic cyber espionage 
deterrence. 
D. Section 1637 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 
At the end of 2014, Congress gave the Obama Administration an-
other tool to combat industrial and economic espionage in cyberspace. 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 contained a small pro-
                                                            
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012). 
 65. See United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 66. See VERIZON, 2013 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 22 (2013), available at 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2013_ 
en_xg.pdf. 
 67. Pangang Grp. Co., 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
 68. Id. at 1069. 
 69. RICHARD J. ELLINGS, NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN RESEARCH, FIVE CHINESE MILITARY 
OFFICERS INDICTED. NOW WHAT? (May 22, 2014), available at 
http://nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/ETA/Ellings 
_FiveIndicted_052214.pdf. 
 70. Id. 
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vision expanding the President’s authority under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act.71 Under this new authority, the President 
can list people, companies, or organizations that fit the statute’s defini-
tion of cyberspies and ban them from sending or receiving payments 
through the U.S. financial system.72 
This legislation intends to change the incentive structure in coun-
tries known to engage in economic espionage in cyberspace.73 While the 
new power may be useful on some level, the attribution problem persists. 
As discussed later in this Article, it is nearly impossible to identify the 
perpetrators of most cyberattacks.74 If we do not know who is doing the 
hacking, we do not know whom to sanction. 
* * * * 
These legal provisions, and the cyberlaw landscape generally, have 
created an extremely fragile and unhealthy system on which we have 
built our entire economic, national security, and critical infrastructure 
systems.75 This system is plagued with a wide variety of cyberthreats 
detrimental to both individuals and the country as a whole. 
III. TYPES OF CYBERTHREATS & THEIR EFFECTS 
A. Types of Threats 
The number of threats that exist in cyberspace are as numerous and 
varied as the people therein. However, the motivations for cyberattacks 
can generally be broken down into three categories: hacktivism, econom-
ic, and espionage.76 
1. Hacktivism 
Individuals engaged in hacktivism, known as “hacktivists,” are 
generally hackers motivated by ideological beliefs, not by material bene-
fit.77 Sometimes, however, they are simply honing their hacking skills, or 
                                                            
 71. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2014). 
 72. National Defense Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1637, 128 Stat. 3292 
(2014). 
 73. Testimony of Former U.S. Senator Slade Gorton Before the House Energy & Commerce 
Committee, IP COMMISSION (July 9, 2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/press/Gorton_Testimony 
_070913.pdf. 
 74. See infra Part IV.B. 
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even hacking for “fun and epic lulz,” as one security firm put it.78 While 
hacktivists have often been classified as low-level “script-kiddies,” 
hacktivism is becoming increasingly sophisticated.79 
One of the best-known examples of hacktivism is the widely publi-
cized saga of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and Anonymous. Assange 
founded WikiLeaks in 200780 and spent the next several years publishing 
state and corporate secrets that were, at best, embarrassing and at worst, 
highly compromising to the safety and security of individuals world-
wide.81 In 2010, WikiLeaks released its largest trove of secrets to date: 
the Afghan War Diary, a “compendium of over 91,000 reports covering 
the war in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010.”82 Many groups—including 
some who do not generally see eye to eye on the issue of security leaks—
criticized the uncensored information dump as irresponsible.83 
The backlash against WikiLeaks, and against Assange’s profession-
al and personal conduct, was widespread.84  A number of countries, in-
cluding WikiLeaks’ home country of Iceland, quickly became “unfriend-
ly” to the Internet icon.85 Meanwhile, PayPal froze the accounts of do-
nors to WikiLeaks, and many banks refused to process transactions for 
the group, including Bank of America, MasterCard, Visa, and others.86 
Hacktivists from around the globe came to WikiLeaks and Assange’s 
defense. At the forefront of the counter-campaign was the cyberanarchist 
group known as Anonymous,87 who launched “Operation Avenge 
Assange.”88 Using an advanced Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) 
attack, Anonymous was able to temporarily take down PayPal, Master-
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Card, Bank of America, a Swiss bank, and the office of the Swedish 
prosecutor.89 
The most recent example of hacktivism came at the end of 2014. 
Sony Pictures intended to release the movie “The Interview” on Christ-
mas Day. The movie was a fictional portrayal of an absurd assassination 
attempt of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In preemptive retaliation, 
North Korean hackers attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment, obtaining 
private emails, personal employee information, and more.90 
Regardless of their motivations, or the sometimes-laudable nature 
of their actions,91 hacktivists are defined by their lack of interest in finan-
cial gain. Instead, they are interested in pushing a social agenda at any 
cost and they do so in a cyberworld that gives them freedom with little 
fear of criminal charges. Even the U.S. courts have begun to realize what 
little power they have over amorphous, non-state cyberactors.92 
2. Economic Crime 
Cyberattacks classified as financial crimes represent, by far, the 
highest percentage of online threats.93 Organized crime groups conduct 
most of these illicit activities.94 In the short-term, these cybercriminals 
target ATMs, point of sale (POS) machines, and desktops to commit 
payment fraud and steal identities.95 A recent example of this type of 
hack is the data breach of retail store Target’s POS terminals.96 In a nine-
teen-day security breach over the high-volume holiday shopping season, 
hackers pilfered data from approximately 70 million customers.97 
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Although security breaches on par with the Target breach may seem 
few and far between, it is likely that similar attacks will increase in fre-
quency due to recent technology changes. In April 2014, Microsoft end-
ed support for Windows XP, including software updates and security 
patches.98 Although this is standard practice for businesses,99 due to its 
stability, Windows XP has been the preferred operating system for spe-
cialized machines including POS systems, medical devices, and many 
others.100 After April 2014, however, security holes that are discovered 
will go unpatched, leaving these systems vulnerable.101 
The long-term goal of cybercriminals is to convert the information 
they gather to cash.102 The majority of financial attacks originate from 
the United States or Eastern European countries such as Romania, Bul-
garia, and the Russian Federation.103 Because a sophisticated cyberattack 
requires a significant amount of effort and skill, and the value of a stolen 
identity may not be immediately recognizable, it would seem that cyber 
financial crime is not a lucrative business. However, some of these crim-
inal operations are so vast, and the volume of information gathered so 
great, the data retrieved generates millions of dollars. 
The most notable example of organized cybercrime is the former 
international syndicate known as Shadowcrew. Co-founded by Andrew 
Mantovani, Shadowcrew was an online marketplace and hacker forum 
where members could learn the trade, obtain people’s personal identifica-
tion, sell the information to other identity thieves, and launder their mon-
ey.104 It was a one-stop-shop for cybercriminals and identity thieves. Be-
fore the Secret Service took down Shadowcrew in 2004, the group ac-
quired 1.5 million stolen credit card numbers and caused over $4 million 
in real losses to credit card companies.105 While the Shadowcrew 
takedown was largely hailed as a win for those cracking down on online 
criminal activity, it is important to remember that the Shadowcrew web-
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site had nearly 4,000 members—the 2004 indictment charged only nine-
teen of them, and nine years later, three remain at large.106 
3. State-Sponsored Economic Espionage & Trade Secret Theft 
Espionage between governments is nearly as old as government it-
self.107 Economic and industrial espionage between companies is also 
nothing new.108 Companies have long sought each other’s secrets in or-
der to gain an economic advantage in the marketplace.109 However, espi-
onage campaigns waged by state intelligence organizations for the pur-
pose of helping their country’s economic actors gain an advantage in the 
marketplace are relatively new. These state intelligence organizations are 
especially prevalent in the cyber realm. 
Unlike the widespread nature of cyber financial criminals, and the 
first-world nature of hacktivists, state-sponsored cyber espionage is con-
centrated in a few countries that have both the capability to effectively 
wage such a campaign and state involvement in industrial markets. The 
countries most culpable for state-sponsored economic espionage are Chi-
na and Russia.110 
China’s national leaders considered the beginning of the 21st centu-
ry to be an opportunity to generate significant national economic 
growth.111 To help facilitate this growth, Chinese intelligence services 
sought to exploit a variety of ways to steal trade secrets.112 A 2011 report 
by the Office of the National Counter Intelligence Executive describes 
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Chinese actors as “the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of 
economic espionage.”113 This disproportionate participation by Chinese 
trade secret thieves is particularly evident in cyberspace. Industry reports 
estimate that 96% of cyberattacks classified as “espionage cases,”114 and 
one-third of those classified as “attack traffic,”115 originate in China. 
China has held the top spot for attack traffic since 2011.116 
Similarly, Russia, due to its “high dependence on natural resources, 
the need to diversify its economy, and the belief that the global economic 
system is tilted toward [the United States],” has begun using human in-
telligence, cyber espionage, and other operations to “collect economic 
information and technology to support [its] economic development and 
security.”117 However, while registering third in attack traffic, Russia 
accounts for only roughly 5% of total attack traffic.118 As opposed to 
China, most of Russia’s cyberattacks were financially motivated and af-
filiated with organized crime, not a state-sponsored agency.119 Unfortu-
nately, experts believe that both China and Russia will remain “aggres-
sive and capable collectors of sensitive US economic information and 
technologies, particularly in cyberspace.”120 
B. Effects of Cyber Insecurity 
1. Economic Implications 
The economic losses due to cyber insecurity are significant. First, 
victims of cyberattacks suffer direct economic loss. In the Shadowcrew 
example discussed previously, the group was able to obtain only 1.5 mil-
lion fake credit cards resulting in $4 million dollars in real losses.121 In a 
more recent sophisticated attack against Heartland Payment Systems (a 
credit card processing company for merchants) hackers were able to ob-
tain 130 million credit and debit card numbers.122 One can only speculate 
at the real losses suffered by the Heartland attack. 
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Second, companies and research institutions lose economically val-
uable assets, such as trade secrets, that are difficult to quantify. In 2013, 
the cybersecurity firm Mandiant123 released a report exposing the persis-
tent and ongoing cyber espionage campaigns waged by a “likely gov-
ernment-sponsored” group in China, now known as “Unit 61398.”124 
Since 2006, Unit 61398 has compromised 141 companies spanning twen-
ty major industries.125 The intelligence that the group obtained included 
“technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, 
business plans, pricing documents,” and other information.126 In one 
case, the group took 6.5 terabytes of information from a single company 
over a ten-month period.127 However, as Mandiant points out: “The activ-
ity we have directly observed likely represents only a small fraction of 
the cyber espionage” that the group conducted.128 
Government officials have confirmed how prevalent the theft of 
trade secrets has become. General Keith Alexander, Director of the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of the U.S. military’s 
newly established Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), stated that cyber 
espionage “represents the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”129  
Third, the indirect cost of cyber insecurity is the increased invest-
ment that companies and individuals must make to protect their data 
from cyberthreats.130 These costs are particularly damaging to small 
businesses because they incur nearly four times the per capita cost of 
dealing with cyberattacks than large organizations.131 
Finally, the most tangible loss is the loss of broad economic growth 
and employment. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 
estimated that in 2009, trade secret theft by China alone cost the United 
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States as much as $2.4 billion.132 The effect of international intellectual 
property (IP) infringement on employment is striking: the USITC report 
further estimated that if IP protection against China improved substan-
tially, the U.S. economy would see an increase of 2.1 million jobs.133 
Furthermore, the IP Commission estimates that the United States loses 
$300 billion annually due to lost intellectual property.134 
2. National Security Implications 
The national security implications of an insecure cyber network are 
just as significant, and in some ways more alarming, than the economic 
implications. The prevalence of insecure networks and compromised 
technology may threaten the United States’ ability to protect itself 
against its enemies. 
There are several ways cyber insecurity is undermining our national 
security infrastructure. First, many of our military technology secrets are 
drained through insecure networks. Operation Shady RAT, as discussed 
above, penetrated thirteen different defense contractors.135 These defense 
contractors were infected for periods ranging from one month to twenty-
one months.136 Significant amounts of classified military technology 
specifications can be pilfered over a twenty-one month period. Suffice it 
to say, our military technology will not remain effective if our enemies 
know how the technology works and how to shut it down. 
Second, a significant amount of military technology is built using 
compromised technology. A 2012 study conducted by the U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee discovered 1,800 cases where counterfeit 
electronic parts were used in military technology.137 The total number of 
counterfeit parts likely exceeds one million.138 These counterfeit parts are 
used in various products, including missile defense systems, Air Force 
planes and helicopters, and thermal sights for the Army.139 The Commit-
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tee concluded, “The use of counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems 
can . . . risk national security . . . .”140 “[M]ost experts cannot look at a 
complicated computer chip and determine whether there is an extra piece 
[of code] here or there, a physical trapdoor.”141 Thus, these counterfeit 
parts could provide access points for hackers to exploit during conflicts. 
Finally, the use of vulnerable technology and the inability to main-
tain secure networks is a liability in future military conflicts, as 
cyberwarfare tactics are already being used in armed conflict.142 In 2008, 
during Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead,” a cyberwar erupted between Is-
raeli and Arabic state-sponsored hackers.143 Also in 2008, Russia invaded 
Georgia in response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia.144 Just before 
Russia began the armed conflict, a variety of cyberattacks began against 
Georgian websites.145 Since the servers connecting Georgia to the outside 
world—located in Russia and Turkey—were disabled or flooded with 
attack traffic, Georgia lost connection to news and information sources, 
was unable to communicate through email, and had to shut down its 
banking system.146 The resulting confusion and lack of intelligence made 
it difficult for Georgia to counter the Russian army.147 Finally, it is sus-
pected that North Korea has begun testing its own cyberwarfare capabili-
ties by attacking government sites in the United States and South Ko-
rea.148 Without secure networks, one can only imagine what 
cyberwarfare tactics would be employed if two world powers entered 
armed conflict.149 
Some have argued that large-scale cyberwarfare could not occur be-
tween large militaries because of mutually assured destruction; the same 
argument explains why militaries keep from engaging in nuclear war.150 
However, because of the unique speed of cyberwar and its ability to dis-
rupt communications and intelligence, there may be an incentive to at-
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tack first if armed conflict seems imminent.151 Unless steps are taken 
now to better secure U.S. networks, national security efforts may be un-
dermined or seriously frustrated in a large-scale conflict. 
3. Critical Infrastructure 
In 2007, an electricity generator in Alaska began to vibrate at unu-
sual speeds.152 It continued to do so until the turbines blew apart causing 
the system to shut down.153 Although it appeared the damage was the 
result of an explosive, it was really caused by hackers miles away.154 
Luckily, this event was later identified as “Project AURORA,” an exper-
iment by Idaho National Laboratory designed to test the security of our 
critical infrastructure.155 Even though this was an authorized, controlled 
experiment, it is indicative of the damage hackers could do to critical 
U.S. infrastructure. 
In the United States, manufacturing controls, electricity grids, bank-
ing and financial systems, telecommunications systems, air traffic control 
systems, water supplies, sewage systems, and countless other critical in-
frastructure systems are electronically operated. Most of these electroni-
cally-operated systems are integrated into a larger system, which is vul-
nerable to attack. The National Intelligence Council has acknowledged 
that cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could be seen by our enemies 
as a way to attack the United States at home.156 Whether by accident, 
terrorist attack, or the hands of bored script kiddies, the loss of any of 
these systems—even for brief periods—could result in serious human 
and economic costs. 
The threat to critical infrastructure around the globe was one of the 
biggest criticisms against the “hacktivist” group Anonymous.157 In a 
2010 information dump, the group released a secret list of worldwide 
critical infrastructure, including locations of hydroelectric plants, phar-
maceutical companies that manufacture smallpox and other vaccines, and 
undersea cables that connect the world’s communication system.158 
While pieces of this information may have been publicly accessible from 
various sources, broadcasting all of it in one place, to some, provided a 
                                                            
 151. Id. 
 152. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 93. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. CARR, supra note 143, at 9–10. 
 157. BRENNER, supra note 24, at 174. 
 158. Id. 
2015] A Temperate Alternative to Cyber Insecurity 1483 
blueprint for terrorists on how to do the most damage.159 The threat 
against our critical infrastructure is significant, and damage to this infra-
structure would affect all other aspects of our social, economic, and po-
litical structures. Without secure networks, it is only a matter of time be-
fore we experience a catastrophic loss of one of these essential systems. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Passive Defense 
The law significantly limits what actions people may take in 
self-defense against hackers, and criminal enforcement of cybercrime is 
rare. As a result, most Internet users—from private individuals to 
high-tech defense contractors—attempt to secure their computers and 
networks using passive defense alone. Passive defense actions usually 
fall into one or more of four categories: (1) controlling system access; (2) 
limiting data access; (3) security administration; and (4) secure system 
design.160 Some basic defensive actions include: requiring usernames and 
passwords, installing anti-virus software and spam-filters, and encrypting 
sensitive data. These passive defense methods are the functional equiva-
lent of locking the door and hiding your valuables to deter burglars from 
entering your house. However, without an effective police force or a 
right of self-defense, it is only a matter of time before the burglars kick 
down your door. 
In order for passive measures to secure a system, they must work 
100% of the time; otherwise, hackers will just keep trying until they suc-
ceed.161 In fact, experts have begun to argue that passive measures alone 
are inadequate for long-term security.162 These defensive measures are 
particularly inadequate against “zero-day” vulnerabilities—newly coded 
threats that are unknown to software manufacturers and security profes-
sionals.163 Anti-virus software works by keeping a catalogue of known 
virus code. When files that contain known malicious code are opened, 
the anti-virus stops their execution. A newly coded zero-day virus and an 
accidental opening of an attachment is all that is required to circumvent 
even the most sophisticated passive defense networks. Without the abil-
ity to defend yourself and your property, and without belief that the po-
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lice are on their way, it is only a matter of time before that burglar picks 
the lock. 
One version of passive defense that has garnered attention is the 
idea of a “public health model” of cyber defense.164 Proponents of the 
public health model suggest that the best way to secure the Internet as a 
whole is to ensure the “health” of each of its citizens.165 Many 
cyberattacks are committed using computers that belong to unassuming 
third parties—also known as “Botnets.”166 For example, a DDOS attack 
uses thousands of these computers to repeatedly send packets of infor-
mation to a network server.167 The information overload crashes the 
server, which is unequipped to deal with the deluge of data. This type of 
attack is how Anonymous was able to bring down financial institu-
tions.168 The hackers had access to thousands of “unhealthy” computers 
that, at some point, were infected with malicious software that allowed 
the hacker to access their system and send these data packets. In contrast, 
DDOS attacks would be extremely difficult to execute if all computers 
online were updated with the last anti-virus definitions and were clear of 
malware because the hackers no longer have their “zombie army” or bot-
net. 
There are two major difficulties encountered when implementing a 
public health model. First, the model relies on the active and willing par-
ticipation of all users. Each Internet participant must actively invest in 
the latest security software, continually check for software patches,169 
and knowledgably and actively avoid less reputable and potentially in-
fectious Internet sites. As one security expert put it: security does not 
work when it is left in the hands of the user.170 
Second, the public health model assumes that viruses and exploits 
occur naturally and independently; it does not account for actors actively 
generating zero-day threats in order to overcome established defenses. 
To take the public health metaphor to an extreme, this would be like 
combatting a series of anthrax filled envelopes by instructing citizens to 
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eat right, exercise, and take their vitamins. While public health models 
should be employed online, and may help prevent attacks from low-level 
hackers, something more needs to be done about high-level threats that 
continually engineer new vulnerabilities. 
B. Hack-Back/Active Defense 
Due to the widespread security risks that exist in the cyberworld, 
and the apparent inability of the government and private actors to stop 
these attacks, many security experts have begun advocating for some 
form of “active defense,” or hack-back.171 Unleashing these tools, propo-
nents argue, would further two broad aims: (1) deterring hackers by pun-
ishing them with unacceptably high costs; and (2) preventing attackers 
from succeeding in their current or future attacks.172 
Active defense or hack-back generally involves three steps: (1) de-
tecting the intrusion; (2) tracing the intruder; and (3) some form of coun-
terstrike.173 For the most part, the first two steps of active defense are 
generally accepted as legal means of network security. Detecting an in-
trusion, which is usually done within one’s own network or computer, 
does not lead to any legal trouble. Because the CFAA only limits unau-
thorized activity, as long as you have authorization to be on the system, 
you may act as you see fit, and it is nearly impossible to violate the 
CFAA. 
The second step—tracing and identifying the intruder—is where the 
idea of hack-back, or mitigative counterstriking, becomes technological-
ly complicated. Usually, attackers are traced using some form of 
traceroute technology.174 However, depending on the type of traceroute, 
correctly identifying the hacker happens, at best, 80% of the time.175 At-
tribution rates drop dramatically if the hacker is spoofing his IP address, 
and the rates become decrease even further if the hacker is using a third-
party command and control system.176 
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The inability to regularly identify the hacker makes the third step—
some form of counterstrike—difficult. Counterstriking can range from 
things as simple as turning over the supposed hacker to law enforcement, 
to damaging the system to prevent it from perpetrating future attacks.177 
Hack-back has some obvious appeal. First, hack-back allows an in-
dividual to respond quickly to attacks perpetrated on his or her network, 
resulting in less network downtime and greater productivity. Second, it 
increases the cost of hacking and makes hackers less effective by creat-
ing barriers to entry—potentially causing some hackers to exit the game 
due to ineffectiveness. 
However, some argue that this would lead to a number of undesira-
ble results, mostly resulting from the problem of attribution. Where full 
hack-back was allowed (i.e. damaging or “locking” a hacker’s systems), 
one can imagine a scenario where victims of cyber espionage discover an 
attack on their system and begin hack-back protocols, only to discover 
that they damaged the personal computer of an innocent third party used 
by the hacker. Thus, a free for all vigilante framework would likely result 
in significant collateral damage to innocent third parties. Even propo-
nents of mitigative counterstriking acknowledge that the current state of 
technology, particularly in respect to identifying hackers, may not be 
sufficient to allow for permissive counterstriking.178 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE: AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATION 
This paper suggests a moderate alternative to hack-back proposals. 
Under a model of authorized investigation, section (a)(2) of the CFAA—
the ban on unauthorized access for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation—should be amended to grant victims of cyberattacks criminal 
and civil immunity for the limited purpose of investigating their attack-
ers. In practice, this would mean that network security professionals, 
businesses, or even private individuals who are technologically compe-
tent, would be able to use necessary means to: (1) access the attacking 
computer; and (2) gather information about the attack, its perpetrator, its 
origin, and its purpose—nothing more. 
Opponents of this limited authorization will certainly cite the same 
concerns they have regarding hack-back. First, they will argue that accu-
rate attribution remains a problem and could damage their systems. 
However, the proposed limited exemption would leave the rest of the 
CFAA in effect, including civil and criminal actions for damaging sys-
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tems. If individuals are found abusing their authority and damaging sys-
tems, prosecutors could bring criminal charges or citizens could file suit 
for compensatory damages. Second, opponents will likely argue that, 
even if damage is not a consideration, allowing individuals and organiza-
tions to access third-party systems violates the third party’s privacy. 
However, as one expert noted, once an innocent third party’s system is 
taken over and used by a hacker for illicit purposes, the privacy of the 
user has already been seriously violated.179 
Allowing cybervictims to access and investigate the systems of 
their attackers provides many benefits, both on the individual and socie-
tal level. First, allowing access helps to further the goals of attribution. 
While inspecting a system, network investigators would be able to de-
termine if the computer in question was the system that perpetrated the 
attack or if it was a command and control system taking advantage of an 
innocent third party. In the case of an innocent third party, investigators 
could use the network logs to determine where the true hacker resides.180 
Second, these investigations could reveal data about the tools and 
exploits the hackers are using in their attacks. Network administrators 
could use this information to further secure passive defense systems from 
future attack. 
Third, the ability to more accurately identify hackers could generate 
significant deterrent effects. “Name and shame” tactics are especially 
effective in some scenarios. By publicly declaring who the attackers are 
and who they work for, international political pressure could be placed 
on the origin country to prosecute hackers. Countries would no longer be 
able to hide behind plausible deniability—claiming that the hackers are 
not in their country. Also, the President’s new authority allows him to 
impose sanctions on those known to engage in cyber espionage.181 At-
tribution may be the key to securing the Internet. Any tool that can re-
sponsibly increase attribution rates should be seriously considered. 
Fourth, in addition to identifying the hacker, investigators could 
identify for whom the hacker works and determine whether the attack 
was an act of state-sponsored espionage or corporate espionage. Fur-
thermore, investigators can more accurately determine who should ulti-
mately be held accountable for the attack. 
Fifth, this proposal aids defensive models by working to create 
“healthier” Internet users. Identifying infected third parties could encour-
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age users to clean their systems by informing them of the vulnerabilities 
and damage they are causing. 
Finally, granting statutory authority for investigations could help 
prevent more drastic self-help methods. Some companies and individu-
als, frustrated at the futility of defensive measures, have already begun 
utilizing mitigative counterstriking and hack-back. The potential collat-
eral damage, and the potential shadow wars due to vigilantism, could be 
avoided by granting users a little of the authority network experts seek. 
In summary, authorizing investigative procedures to organizations 
and individuals that have been attacked allows for greater attribution and 
defense while limiting the risk of collateral damage to innocent third par-
ties. Although some advocate for more aggressive measures, authorized 
investigation would allow for increased security while testing the water 
for greater individual action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We stand in a valley of moderation, and we are being attacked on 
all sides. The legal system that developed around the Internet is insuffi-
cient to protect what it has become. What was designed as a collabora-
tive tool for a small set of researchers is now the backbone for nearly 
everything in modern society. The Internet manages our food distribution 
systems, our water supply, our electric grids, our missile defense net-
works, and more. We use the Internet to manage both our personal 
401(k)s and the New York Stock Exchange. The Internet is where we file 
health insurance claims and purchase health plans—sending our private 
medical information across unknown servers. The same system that gen-
erated unprecedented technological development and economic growth 
over recent decades is also a system under attack. Hacktivists, cybercrim-
inals, and state-sponsored cyberspies use the Internet to steal identities, 
pilfer trade secrets, crash websites, and divulge national security secrets. 
Countries are lacing servers and private computers with backdoors and 
corrupt code waiting to supplement armed attack with cyberwar. 
While current laws have brought about some successful attempts at 
maintaining an orderly cyberspace, attribution and procedural problems 
continue to ensure that most hackers are never held accountable for their 
actions. As a result, many cyber experts are now advocating for a system 
that permits hack-back, allowing private individuals and organizations to 
defend themselves. Others worry that this practice will result in collateral 
damage to innocent third parties because of these same attribution prob-
lems. A very limited criminal and civil exemption allowing victims of 
cyberattacks to investigate their attackers could solve many issues while 
limiting third-party collateral damage. By allowing victims to access 
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their attacker’s computer without authorization and obtain information, 
victims are able to gather the intelligence needed to defend themselves, 
help secure the system more broadly, shed light on the attacker and his or 
her motives, and increase the cost to hackers, all while limiting the po-
tential for third-party collateral damage. Finally, a legally-authorized, 
limited hack-back could stem the tide of growing cyber vigilantism while 
providing a test case by which we can judge future cyber self-defense 
proposals. 
